Where Money Came From · Lesson 31 · 12 min read

Gold, and Why It Stopped Working

When an Exchange Rate Was Arithmetic
Kanin D. Alldredge
Legal & Quantitative Analyst / Author / Educator, The Currency Classroom
Free

1Why Exchange Rates Exist at All

Start with a question so basic it usually goes unasked. Why does an exchange rate need to exist?

Because trade crosses borders. A British firm selling to an American buyer gets paid in something, and it has costs in something else. Somewhere in that transaction a conversion has to happen.

Without a reliable conversion, trade becomes a bet on top of a bet. You wager that your goods sell, and you wager separately on what the money will be worth when it arrives. Most businesses do not want the second wager.

Lesson 29 gave the deeper version. An exchange rate compares two monetary systems continuously, weighing their credibility, their inflation, and the institutions behind them.

Which produces the observation that everything after this rests on.

Exchange rates do not move randomly. They move because that comparison changed.

Or because the market believes it is about to. But for roughly forty years, the comparison did not move at all.

2A Promise Made in Metal

From the late 1870s until 1914, the major economies ran what became known as the classical gold standard.

The arrangement was a promise. Each country declared a fixed weight of gold that its currency could be exchanged for, guaranteed by its own treasury.

CurrencyDefined As
One US dollar1.5 grams of gold
One pound sterling7.3 grams of gold

Now do something with those two numbers. If a pound is 7.3 grams and a dollar is 1.5, then the pound is worth 7.3 divided by 1.5 dollars.

7.3 รท 1.5 = 4.87

And the pound traded at about $4.87. The exact parity was $4.8665, which is why you will also see it quoted as $4.86.

That is the whole system in one division. The exchange rate was not negotiated, not set by a committee, and not subject to anyone's opinion.

If you knew the gold content of two currencies, you knew the rate between them.

Figure 31.1: Two gold weights divided by each other gave the exchange rate.
Figure 31.1Two gold weights divided by each other gave the exchange rate.

The practical result was remarkable stability. A British exporter did not worry about the pound weakening before payment arrived. An investor financing a railway in Argentina did not hedge currency risk, because there was none worth hedging. Businesses planned across decades with a confidence no system since has matched.

Figure 31.2: For about forty years the pound held close to $4.86.
Figure 31.2For about forty years the pound held close to $4.86.

3The Machine That Was Meant to Self-Correct

A fixed rate raises an obvious problem. What happens when one country buys far more than it sells?

The gold standard had an answer, and it worked without anybody deciding anything. The Scottish philosopher David Hume described it in 1752.

StepIn the Deficit CountryIn the Surplus Country
1Gold flows out to pay for importsGold flows in
2The money supply contractsThe money supply expands
3Prices fallPrices rise
4Exports become cheaper and more attractiveExports become less competitive
5Trade rebalances, and gold returnsTrade rebalances, and gold leaves

Both sides move toward each other at once. No authority intervenes. The imbalance corrects itself, in theory, through nothing but the movement of metal.

Figure 31.3: Gold flowing between countries was meant to correct trade imbalances on its own.
Figure 31.3Gold flowing between countries was meant to correct trade imbalances on its own.

It is an elegant design, and it depended on both sides actually doing their part.

4Three Cracks, Present From the Start

The system had three weaknesses. None of them appeared later as the arrangement aged. All three were there from the beginning.

Figure 31.4: All three weaknesses were built into the system from the start.
Figure 31.4All three weaknesses were built into the system from the start.
WeaknessWhat It Meant
The supply constraintHow much money could exist depended on how much gold came out of the ground. An economy could grow faster than the gold supply, and then money became scarce for no economic reason.
The adjustment asymmetryThe deficit country was forced to adjust, because it was running out of gold. The surplus country could simply hold its gold and decline to inflate. Pain fell on one side.
Dependence on political willThe whole thing required governments to accept domestic hardship in defense of an exchange rate. That is easy in prosperity and very hard otherwise.

The second one deserves a moment, because it explains much of what followed. The machine only self-corrected if both sides corrected. A country gaining gold had no forced reason to let its prices rise, and every domestic reason not to. So the deficit country absorbed the adjustment instead, through falling prices, falling wages, and unemployment.

Figure 31.5: The deficit country was forced to adjust, while the surplus country could sit on its gold.
Figure 31.5The deficit country was forced to adjust, while the surplus country could sit on its gold.

The third is the one that eventually mattered most. A monetary rule is only as strong as the willingness to suffer for it.

5August 1914

The test came suddenly.

When war began in August 1914, every major combatant needed to spend on a scale the gold standard forbade. Industrial warfare required creating money far beyond what gold reserves allowed.

Faced with a choice between the monetary rule and national survival, every major belligerent suspended convertibility within days.

Not after years of deliberation. Days.

Forty years of stability, set aside almost at once when it collided with something governments cared about more. That is the third weakness, at full scale.

Figure 31.6: The key events from the classical gold standard to the United States leaving gold.
Figure 31.6The key events from the classical gold standard to the United States leaving gold.

6The Wrong Rate

After the war, almost everyone assumed the gold standard would return. It had delivered four decades of stability, and its suspension had been a wartime emergency.

The problem was that the world it belonged to was gone. Britain had sold overseas investments to pay for the war. The United States had turned from a debtor into the world's largest creditor. Four years of fighting had rearranged the prices and trade flows that made the old arrangement work.

Britain restored it anyway. On April 28, 1925, Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill announced that sterling would return to gold at its pre-war rate of $4.86.

The economics said that rate was about ten percent too high for where the British economy actually stood.

Churchill was not restoring a rate. He was restoring a symbol.

Figure 31.7: Britain restored the pre-war rate, about ten percent above where its economy stood.
Figure 31.7Britain restored the pre-war rate, about ten percent above where its economy stood.

It is one of the clearest cases in economic history of a precise public prediction being made, ignored, and then vindicated in every particular.

Figure 31.8: Keynes set out the chain of consequences in 1925, before they arrived.
Figure 31.8Keynes set out the chain of consequences in 1925, before they arrived.

7When Defending the Peg Made It Worse

The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 is where most people begin the story of the Great Depression. But a crash does not have to become a decade.

What turned a severe financial crisis into a catastrophe was a series of policy decisions, most of them made in defense of the gold standard.

When gold began leaving after Britain's exit in September 1931, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates, with American banks already failing. The logic was gold standard logic. Higher rates attract gold, and attracting gold defends convertibility.

It also drained money from a banking system that was already collapsing.

Figure 31.9: Raising rates to defend the peg made the banking collapse worse.
Figure 31.9Raising rates to defend the peg made the banking collapse worse.
In the United States, 1929 to 1933
American banks that failedAbout 9,000
Industrial productionFell by nearly half
UnemploymentReached 25 percent
The money supplyContracted by roughly a third

And the mechanism meant to stabilize the world spread the damage instead. Countries holding their pegs had to match American rate rises to stop gold flowing out. They tightened policy exactly when their economies needed the opposite.

Figure 31.10: The scale of the damage in the United States between 1929 and 1933.
Figure 31.10The scale of the damage in the United States between 1929 and 1933.

The recovery data is stark. Countries that left gold earlier generally recovered faster. Britain in 1931, the United States in 1933. Those that held on longest suffered longest.

Figure 31.11: Countries that left gold earlier generally recovered sooner.
Figure 31.11Countries that left gold earlier generally recovered sooner.

8How Monetary Systems Fail

The interwar years produced something more useful than a set of dates. They produced a sequence, and it has repeated ever since.

StepWhat Happens
1Rules get bent. A country stops fully honoring the arrangement, usually for understandable domestic reasons.
2Credibility erodes. Participants notice, and begin to doubt the commitment will hold.
3Speculative pressure arrives. Money moves against the position, testing whether the commitment is real.
4A choice is forced. Accept serious domestic pain to defend it, or abandon it. And when one country abandons, others follow.

Look at where the sequence starts. Not with an economic shock. Not with a market. It starts with credibility, which is the fourth pillar from Lesson 29 and the one that moves fastest.

Figure 31.12: The four steps by which monetary systems fail, starting with credibility.
Figure 31.12The four steps by which monetary systems fail, starting with credibility.

Which is why this is not history for its own sake. Two of the largest single-day moves in modern currency markets appear later in this series. Both are that four-step sequence reaching step four in front of a live market.

The next lesson picks up in 1944, when 44 nations met in a New Hampshire hotel to design a system that would prevent all of this from happening again.

Three Things to Remember

Try This

Fifteen minutes. Two of these steps are arithmetic and the rest is observation.

Words From This Lesson

TermWhat It Means
Gold standardA system in which each currency is fixed to a specific weight of gold, making exchange rates a matter of arithmetic.
ConvertibilityThe guarantee that currency can be exchanged for gold at the declared rate. Suspending it means breaking that promise.
Price-specie flowThe self-correcting mechanism by which gold movements were meant to rebalance trade automatically.
ParityThe declared official rate at which a currency is fixed.
Deficit countryOne importing more than it exports, and therefore losing gold under the old system.
Competitive devaluationDeliberately weakening a currency to make exports cheaper. Self-defeating when several countries do it at once.
Speculative pressureMoney moving against a fixed rate to test whether the commitment behind it is real.

Test Your Knowledge

Eight questions. Answer them all before checking the key on the following pages. If a question gives you trouble, the answer key tells you which section to revisit.

1. Under the classical gold standard, how was an exchange rate determined?
  1. A. By negotiation between central banks
  2. B. By international treaty, revised annually
  3. C. By supply and demand in an open market
  4. D. By dividing the gold weight of one currency by the other
2. A pound was 7.3 grams of gold and a dollar was 1.5 grams. What was the rate?
  1. A. About $4.87
  2. B. About $2.05
  3. C. About $8.80
  4. D. About $10.95
3. What was the price-specie flow mechanism meant to do?
  1. A. Set the gold price each year
  2. B. Correct trade imbalances automatically through gold movements
  3. C. Allow governments to devalue when needed
  4. D. Prevent gold from leaving the country
4. Which country bore most of the adjustment burden under the gold standard?
  1. A. The surplus country, which had to inflate
  2. B. Both equally, by design and in practice
  3. C. The deficit country, which was losing gold
  4. D. Whichever had the larger economy
5. What happened to the gold standard in August 1914?
  1. A. It was strengthened by wartime cooperation
  2. B. Major belligerents suspended convertibility within days
  3. C. It continued unchanged until 1918
  4. D. Only Britain suspended it
6. What was wrong with Britain's 1925 return to gold?
  1. A. Other countries refused to participate
  2. B. Gold reserves were insufficient
  3. C. The rate chosen was about ten percent too high for the economy
  4. D. It was announced without warning
7. Why did the Federal Reserve raise rates in late 1931, with banks already failing?
  1. A. To fight inflation
  2. B. To fund government spending
  3. C. To support the stock market
  4. D. To attract gold and defend convertibility
8. What is the first step in the sequence by which monetary systems fail?
  1. A. Rules get bent, and credibility begins to erode
  2. B. A speculative attack
  3. C. A recession begins
  4. D. Foreign reserves run out

Answer Key

Each answer explains why the correct choice is correct, why the others are not, and where to reread.

Question 1 · correct answer D

Each currency was defined as a fixed weight of gold, so the rate between any two followed by division. No discretion was involved.

A describes how some modern arrangements are managed. C describes floating rates, which came much later. B is wrong because the rates followed from the gold definitions rather than from periodic agreement.

Review: Section 2, A Promise Made in Metal

Question 2 · correct answer A

7.3 divided by 1.5 is about 4.87, which matches the rate sterling actually traded at.

B divides the wrong way round, which would give the dollar in pounds. C and D do not follow from either division.

Review: Section 2, A Promise Made in Metal

Question 3 · correct answer B

Gold leaving a deficit country contracted its money supply and lowered prices, making its exports more attractive. The surplus country experienced the reverse, and trade was meant to rebalance without intervention.

A describes a policy decision rather than an automatic mechanism. C is close to the opposite, since the system was designed to avoid discretionary devaluation. D describes an aim some governments had, not the mechanism.

Review: Section 3, The Machine That Was Meant to Self-Correct

Question 4 · correct answer C

The deficit country was forced to adjust because it was running out of gold. The surplus country could hold its gold and decline to let prices rise, so the pain fell on one side.

A describes what the theory required and practice did not deliver. B describes the design rather than the outcome, which is exactly the gap this section identifies. D is wrong because size did not determine who adjusted.

Review: Section 4, Three Cracks, Present From the Start

Question 5 · correct answer B

Financing industrial warfare required creating money far beyond gold reserves, so every major combatant suspended convertibility within days of the war beginning.

A reverses what happened. C overstates how long the rule survived, since it was set aside almost immediately. D is wrong because the suspension was general rather than British alone.

Review: Section 5, August 1914

Question 6 · correct answer C

Sterling returned at its pre-war parity of $4.86, which the economics said was roughly ten percent above where the British economy stood after the war.

B was not the binding problem, since the rate itself was the issue. A is wrong because other countries were also restoring pegs. D is wrong because the decision was announced in a Budget speech.

Review: Section 6, The Wrong Rate

Question 7 · correct answer D

Higher rates attract gold, and attracting gold defends convertibility. That was gold standard logic applied to a collapsing banking system, and it drained liquidity precisely when the system could least absorb it.

A is wrong because prices were falling rather than rising. C reverses the effect, since higher rates pressured asset prices. B describes fiscal policy rather than the rate decision.

Review: Section 7, When Defending the Peg Made It Worse

Question 8 · correct answer A

The sequence begins with rules being bent for understandable domestic reasons, which starts credibility eroding. Everything else follows from that.

B is the third step, and it arrives because credibility has already weakened. C and D can accompany the sequence without starting it, since the trigger is a loss of confidence in the commitment.

Review: Section 8, How Monetary Systems Fail

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Where Money Came From is written by Kanin D. Alldredge for The Currency Classroom, and it is free to read. There is more free from CNS: start here.

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